The division of fiscal and legislative responsibilities forms the backbone of every federal constitution. Germany has attracted attention as one of the clearest examples of "cooperative federalism" and, recently, as a locus of debates about more competitive routes to organizing federal systems. This article examines trends since 1948 that centralized legislative competencies and heightened the sharing of financial burdens. The unidirectional dynamic in these reforms -underscored by failed attempts at devolution in the 1980s and 1990s -is explained by focussing on politics in the Bundesrat, the second house in the German Parliament, in which state governors are seated. "Federalism" policies position the rich states against the federal government; any majority to change the system must be built with poor states' votes. The poor states, likely losers of competition among jurisdictions, vote for financial solidarity and centralized policymaking but against devolution. The article predicts a continuation of the problematic status quo, and concludes by contrasting two evaluations of Germany's failure to achieve a more "competitive federalism."
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Federalism and Its Discontents:
Fiscal and Legislative Powersharing in Germany,
1948-1999
The constitutional division of fiscal and legislative responsibilities forms the backbone of every federal system. German federalism has attracted attention because it represents one of the clearest and, until recently, one of the most successful examples of "cooperative federalism:" tax resources are shared equitably between levels of government and across regions, while policy is made by the federal and state governments jointly rather than autonomously. Since unification in 1990 Germany's cooperative federalism has been regarded with increasing skepticism in part because the poor incentives it creates for policymakers are said to contribute to the country's lackluster economic performance. As such, developments in German federalism are related to a larger debate about "competitive" routes to organizing federal structures, a debate dominated by those who argue that cooperation among jurisdictions is the best guarantee that policies are made well and democratically. proponents. The article explains these changes in competencies, which are discussed with the following labels: fiscal devolution (state level responsibility) contrasts with burdensharing or solidarity (pooled responsibility); legislative devolution contrasts with centralized-or joint-decisionmaking.
Most explanations for the lack of fiscal and legislative devolution in Germany center on three variables: party politics, consensus norms, and predilections for solidarity rooted in either historical memory or political culture. This paper, in contrast, focuses on the politics of the Bundesrat, the second house of Parliament in which each of the state governor's offices is represented. I argue that the Bundesrat majorities required to change laws defining German federalism cannot be built without the votes of the poor states. These states will not support devolution because they understand they are the likely losers in a competition of jurisdictions against states with greater resources. The poor states do vote for policy proposals that centralize financial burdens or those that, by standardizing regulations across the nation, prevent the richer states from outperforming the rest. In short, I argue that the only reforms to the federal system that will be approved by the Bundesrat are those that embrace solidarity and centralization. Section one of the paper reviews existing explanations. Sections two and three apply the argument to developments in legislative competencies and tax revenue equalization policies since the founding of the Federal Republic. The possibility that an external actor may compel
Bundesrat decisionmakers to endorse devolution is discussed in light of the Federal Constitutional Court's 1999 rulings on the equalization policy. The conclusion presents a synthesis of current dissatisfactions with German federalism before raising the question of how to interpret, from a normative standpoint, the very likely continuation of this status quo.
Section One: Existing Explanations.
The failure of federal reform in post-unification Germany is, from the Economist's or the Financial Times' perspective, hardly surprising. Sclerotic Germany, after all, is reputedly incapable of reform: shopping is still not permitted on Sundays, the "bloated" welfare state has proven resistant to slimming attempts by both the Christian
Democrats and now the Social Democrats, and employment regulations are still among 3 the most rigid in Europe. The lack of reform in the policies defining German federalism in the 1990s contrasts starkly, however, with policy innovations in biotechnology and venture capital promotion that have transformed Germany from a laggard to a leader in Europe. 3 Similarly, the lack of federal reforms in the 1990s contrasts with the large scale reforms to these very policies in the 1950s and 1960s, and especially in 1969. These reforms increased centralization (or "joint decisionmaking") by transferring more competencies and financial responsibilities to the federal level -to either the Bund or to the Bundesrat. The reforms increased solidarity (or "burdensharing") by raising the level of transfers from rich to poor states and by making more and more financial obligations into joint rather than individual state responsibilities. In contrast, the reforms proposed in the 1990s were aimed at devolution and a reduction of solidarity. The puzzle emerging from the events of the 1990s, therefore, is the failure a certain kind of reform -reforms that devolve responsibilities to the Länder and that reduce the complicated interlocking of fiscal and legislative competencies among levels of government.
To explain the solidaristic bent to German policymaking, analysts have looked to history, to decisionmakers' individual and collective memory of the tragedies that have occurred in Germany when economic disparities were too great. Germans have learned through suffering to value solidarity, it is argued, so that in the postwar period they continue to support, even at considerable expense, the sharing of burdens. 4 Yet it is difficult to make a compelling case for the causal role of historical lessons. The Germans also learned lessons about the dangers of centralization during the Nazi years, yet these lessons seem not to impact current policy decisions. Without this careful analysis of the structures anchoring specific lessons to outcomes, "memory" seems a less than convincing causal explanation for developments in federal relations.
Another common explanation for the success of reforms in the 1960s and their failure in the 1990s is party politics. Presidents represent their Länder's specific interests which may contradict national party platforms). In short, Bundesrat decisions need only a simple majority, yet they too yield policies that are centralizing and solidaristic. Something other than the mechanism of consensus decisionmaking must therefore account for these outcomes.
As a final alternate explanation, the constitutional requirement that policies achieve an equalization of living conditions throughout the country deserves mention. In 1948, the Minister Presidents of the German states met to sign a Basic Law creating a federal government in the tri-zone. These Minister Presidents represented states with functioning governments legitimated by existing constitutions, and had no interest in drafting away a majority of their rights to the federal government they were creating. Moreover, they worked under the watchful eyes of the Allies, intent on preventing a strong national government from arising on the ashes of Nazi Germany.
The drafters of the Basic Law thus granted wide-reaching legislative prerogatives to themselves. All powers not expressly given to the federal government were reserved for the states, or labeled areas of "concurrent jurisdiction" in which the Bund might legislate only if federal law were demonstrably necessary to achieve uniformity in markets and living conditions (note that, unlike "concurrent jurisdiction" in the United States, in
Germany only one level of government may legislate on these issues).
The Länder were not equally capable of accepting these considerable 14 "letting the Bund in" is a multilateral forum in which they meet the federal government en masse, thus shaping the path to centralization. In contrast, the opposition of the The Länder also disagreed amongst themselves about how much of their VAT should be redistributed to eradicate financial differences. After it became clear that the poor states lacked the two-thirds majority necessary to get need-based redistribution of all the VAT, they demanded bilateral federal transfers freed from any requirement for co-payments.
The negotiations were deadlocked until the federal government offered vertical transfers without requiring matching contributions from the Länder (Art. 104) in exchange for the Länder's agreement to a smaller, 30% share of the VAT.
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The Länder then agreed to a three stage equalization scheme (see Figure One) .
They would distribute a quarter of their VAT to bring all states to 92% of average per capita strength, then transfer tax "surplus" to bring the weakest to 95%, and finally permit federal transfers to the poorer states for particular needs.
In the final version of the reform, the Bund, which received less of the Joint Taxes than it wanted, did receive more stable revenue sources, to be adjusted according to need.
Most importantly for the Bund, its active involvement had been officially sanctioned in areas of the Länder's competencies, through the Joint Tasks as well as the federal supplementary transfers. The richer Länder were able to keep a ceiling on their burdensharing obligations, and secured nearly as much VAT as they initially demanded.
While the poor did not get the equalization they wished (of 97 to 99 percent), they did considerably better after the reforms than before. The equalization target was raised to at least 95 percent (from 91 percent); obstacles to receiving federal transfers were removed;
and although only a quarter of the VAT was to be distributed by need, the redistribution of the remaining 75% on a per capita basis favored them (turnover tax revenues are lower in low-growth, poorer regions). In all, the outcome was remarkably favorable for the poorer Länder even though they were, at the time, in the absolute minority -the consequence of the Bund's interest in expanding its influence, the richer Länder's decision to accept some centralization in order to minimize increases in the financial obligations they assumed, and the need to secure a two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat to change the constitution. (The western Länder's share of the net total costs generated by unification turns out, by one estimate, to be as large or larger than the Bund's when the perspective is broadened to include funding commitments made before the Solidarity Pact as well as changes in tax laws and public transfers. 34 ) 30 Early in the 1970s, federal payments in stage 3 increased quickly from a very low level, as the Bund's ad hoc contribution was formalized at 1.5% of its VAT. The Bavarian proposal, pushed by a cross-party tandem of CSU (Bavaria) and SPD (Northrhine-Westphalia), gained unanimous support from the Länder. It required the Bund to give the Länder eight per cent more of the VAT revenues, with which money the eastern German Länder could then be included in the existing financial equalization scheme. Two stages of horizontal distribution would then be followed by vertical distribution (federal grants), guaranteeing the poorest at least 99.5% of average per capita income, with additional "perks" tailored to attract small eastern and western states. The outcome: at a time when states with but roughly 35% of average per capita taxes were included in the system, equalization was raised to at least 99.5%, but in practice 120% for the eastern Länder and 190% for the city-state Bremen when including stage three federal transfers (see Table One ).
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The Länder's ultimate unity rested on compromises that reproduced longstanding points of contention. The most important compromises occurred between the eastern and richer western Länder. The eastern Länder agreed not to challenge the reallocation (Zerlegungs) mechanism for corporate and personal income tax, and retracted demands that local governments' strength be fully included in calculations of a Land's financial strength. In exchange, they received guarantees that for the next ten years they would receive nearly 100 per cent of the average income across Länder.
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These compromises, however, made the west's burden look larger than it is. The
Bund's VAT contribution meant to assist the eastern Länder became labeled as VAT belonging to all the Länder. Thus, the large transfers of VAT from west to east appear ridiculously generous when in fact much of the revenue the western Länder are transferring was never "theirs" in the first place. Similarly, the decision not to weight local governments' strength at its full value masks the western Länder's relative financial capabilities. In 1997, were the local governments' financial capabilities included at 100
per cent rather than deflated to 50 per cent, the payer Länder would have been obliged to After the 1993/1995 reforms, the politics of burdensharing returned to normal. to-do Baden-Württemberg in its equalization cases before the Court in the 1980s) -endorsed most of the current practice including high transfers to the eastern states. But it did admonish lawmakers to evaluate the appropriateness of the city-state privilege and the 50% weighting of local governments' financial capacity; to consider lowering the equalization target below 99.5% to allow for "appropriate" but not complete equalization;
and to restrict but not eliminate the federal supplementary grants that distort the "performance order" (or give rich states lower revenues than the poor after the equalization process). In other words, the Court requires legislators to revisit the longstanding points of contention in the policy, while reaffirming the general approach. It is likely that the new policy will slightly reduce city-state privileges, while continuing generous federal transfers for special needs -transfers to which all states, including the city-states, are entitled. If the Länder can unite around this plan, more of the total burden will shift from the richer states to the federal government: again, the politics of the Bundesrat will drive centralization rather than devolution.
Section Four: Conclusions
Despite popular conceptions that Germany is incapable of reform, significant changes to the federal division of fiscal and legislative responsibilities have occurred since 1948. The clear division of tax revenues and lawmaking authority between the states and the federal government has been repeatedly muddied, so that today almost all important policies are decided jointly. The weakest Länder precipitated centralization and increased burdensharing by declaring themselves unable to meet existing obligations.
The strong Länder and the Bund responded with proposals for reapportioning the responsibilities -each seeking to maximize their own decisionmaking authority. For the Bund with its larger budget, this meant using direct subsidies to create "golden leashes"
and "buy" policymaking authority. For the strong Länder, often unwilling to prevent the What are the chances that these three problems will be addressed? What possible ways out exist? The chances of simultaneous fiscal and legislative reform need not be over estimated, especially after unification when such a large proportion of the Länder are poor. It has simply become much harder for any national party to endorse a program that would be unattractive to the voters in so many Länder.
A second option is territorial reform to create fewer, more equal states -a frequent and serious proposal. 41 The trouble is that the citizens appear to have grown 
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The third and most modest reform option would be an embrace of the "Sinatra Doctrine" in which the Länder separately "do it their way." 42 The poor could continue to seek close financial and legislative cooperation with the federal government, while the richer could pursue, on their own budgets, a broader and more specialized array of policy priorities. In fact, this strategy has already been followed in some policy areas, such as technology promotion policy. 43 However in broad areas of law including unemployment policy, civil servant law, and most tax policies, individual Länder are precluded from passing their own policies because national law already exists. For Sinatra federalism to work, the Bund's role in concurrent jurisdictions would have to be further rolled back.
Because it raises the specter of a "two-class federalism," and because it weakens the Länder's ability to present a united front vis-à-vis the Bund, it is not clear that a "Sinatra" approach would find majority support in the Bundesrat.
The chances of radical renewal of the federal system -through territorial reform or a thoroughgoing revision of legislative and financial competencies -are close to zero.
Because a continuation of the status quo is the most likely outcome, it is worthwhile to think briefly about its costs and benefits. Most of this article, concerned with attempts to reform the existing system, has reviewed its costs: efficiency is harmed, democratic responsiveness and accountability are reduced, and the strongest states are fettered, reducing GDP and employment growth for the nation as a whole.
But the current system also has clear benefits. The expensive investment in solidarity means that differences in citizens' quality of life -across regions and across social classes -are smaller in reunified Germany than in many OECD countries. Poverty is very low, public schools are uniformly good, publicly funded healthcare is commendable. As a result, Germany avoids the costs of high crime as well as preventing crime. Germany avoids the costs (monetary and non-monetary) of having a significant number of children fail to become productive members of society, of urban decay, of insufficient maintenance in infrastructure. Solidarity is expensive; but so, less directly perhaps, is the absence of solidarity.
42 Jeffery, 1996, pp. 94-95. 43 Richard Deeg, "Economic Globalization and the Shifting Boundaries of German Federalism," Publius 26:1 (Winter, 1996): pp. 27-52.
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In the "first" or original federal country, the United States, the preference for cooperative federalism inaugurated with Progressive era reforms in the 1890s solidified into a practical consensus at least by the time of New Deal. But this preference has slowly eroded, in academic discourse, to a new consensus that competitive federalismthe process of competition among jurisdictions via the mobility of "voters/consumers" -offers the best guarantee of policy responsiveness and efficiency. 44 Germans, especially in the strong states and conservative parties, have also embraced the idea of "marketpreserving federalism." Yet nothing like a consensus exists in the normative debates about federalism in Germany, because against this procedural justification for competitive federalism exists a substantive argument for cooperative federalism. This argument rejects competition as the raison d'être of federal systems (units need not unite if their only object is to compete), and rejects the assumption that as long as the process is sound, outcomes will be good. Instead, the substantive approach begins by defining the outcomes desired: that citizens in poorer, or more poorly administered, Länder have equal access to public spending; that labor have no incentive to be mobile (migration is destabilizing); and that policymakers have no incentive to engage in "races to the bottom" -races whose outcomes are collectively irrational (or at least diverge from these advocates' conceptions of the common good). 45 The process for guaranteeing these outcomes, then, is a continuation of nationally standardized policies and financial burdensharing.
Thus far decentralizing reforms in Germany proposed by the strongest governments have been blocked by the weakest. Ultimately, to overcome this opposition, the political class would need a broad belief in the benefits of change. Keynesian centralization garnered this broad support -because it was believed to provide both procedural and substantive improvements over the status quo for all concerned. In contrast, neo-liberal ideas informing the suggestions for a more competitive federalism today focus on procedure, leaving inadequately answered substantive questions about distributive justice given a competition among regions. From a substantive perspective, it
